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CRIMIAL PROCEDURE LAW
New York Supreme Court, Kings County, holds that audiotape pre-
pared by Office of City Medical Examiner during autopsy consti-
tutes Rosario material
In 1961, "a right sense of justice"' motivated the New York
Court of Appeals to require that a prosecutor provide defense
counsel with all pre-trial statements made by a prosecution wit-
ness relating to the subject matter of the witness' testimony.2
Over the past thirty years, this requirement, commonly called the
Rosario rule and subsequently codified in CPL section 240.45,3
has been limited to material that is within the prosecution's "pos-
session or control."4 With little guidance from the New York
1 People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286, 289, 173 N.E.2d 881, 883, 213 N.Y.S.2d 448,
450, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 866 (1961).
2 Id. Rosario also held that a defendant is entitled to a prior statement regardless
of whether the statement contradicted or otherwise varied from the witness' testi-
mony during trial. Id. The court reasoned that the defense attorney was in a better
position than the trial judge to determine whether the statements would be helpful.
Id. at 290, 173 N.E.2d at 883, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 451. This holding overruled prior case
law which held that a defendant was only entitled to statements that were inconsis-
tent with the witness' testimony. See JFRo~m PRI CE, RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE § 468
(10th ed. 1973 & Supp. 1985) (stating that pre-Rosario rule only required that incon-
sistent witness statements be delivered to defendants); see also People v. Walsh, 262
N.Y. 140, 149-50, 186 N.E. 422, 425 (1933) (stating that prior statement made by
witness in criminal case may be used for cross-examination purposes if statement
contains "contradictory matter").
3 See CPL § 240.45(1)(a) (McKinney 1993). CPL § 240.45(1)(a) provides:
1. After the jury has been sworn and before the prosecutor's opening ad-
dress, or in the case of a single judge trial after commencement and
before submission of evidence, the prosecutor shall, subject to a protec-
tive order, make available to the defendant:
(a) Any written or recorded statement, including any testimony before a
grand jury and an examination videotaped pursuant to section
190.32 of this chapter, made by a person whom the prosecutor in-
tends to call as a witness at trial, and which relates to the subject
matter of the witness's testimony.
Id. This codification clarified the deadline by which the prosecutor must deliver the
prior statements to the defendant. See PRINCE, supra note 2, § 468. There is a recipro-
cal obligation requiring a defendant to turn over statements of defense witnesses af-
ter the prosecution's direct case, unless the statements are subject to a protective
order. See CPL § 240.45(2)(a) (McKinney 1993); PRINCE, supra note 2, § 468.
4 See, e.g., People v. Flynn, 79 N.Y.2d 879, 882, 589 N.E.2d 383, 385, 581 N.Y.S.2d
160, 162 (1992) (holding that accident report filed with Department of Motor Vehicles
was not Rosario material); People v. Tissois, 72 N.Y.2d 75, 78, 526 N.E.2d 1086, 1087,
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Court of Appeals, trial courts have attempted to interpret the
phrase "possession or control," only to achieve disparate results.5
Recently, in People v. Jones,6 the New York Supreme Court, Kings
County, held that a prosecutor's access to an audiotape prepared
by the Office of the City Medical Examiner ("OCME") constituted
sufficient control over the material to invoke the Rosario rule,
even though the OCME is an independent agency and the audi-
otape was never actually in the possession of the district
attorney.7
In Jones, the evidence adduced at trial established that the
defendant, while driving a stolen vehicle at an excessive speed to
evade the police, struck and killed a four-year-old child who was
riding a bicycle on the sidewalk.' The Appellate Division, Second
531 N.Y.S.2d 228, 229 (1988) (concluding that statements made to social worker were
not Rosario material); People v. Fishman, 72 N.Y.2d 884, 886, 528 N.E.2d 1212, 1213,
532 N.Y.S.2d 739, 740 (1988) (determining that untranscribed plea minutes were not
Rosario material); People v. Reedy, 70 N.Y.2d 826, 827, 517 N.E.2d 1324, 1325, 523
N.Y.S.2d 438, 439 (1987) (finding that personal notes taken by victim were not Rosa-
rio material).
5 See Cerisse Anderson, Autopsy Issue Divides Trial Judges in State, N.Y. L.J.,
Feb. 8, 1994, at 1 [hereinafter Autopsy Issue]; Cerisse Anderson, Tug of War overAu-
topsy Notes, Tapes, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 6, 1994, at 1 [hereinafter Tug of War]. A majority of
the trial courts have held that materials produced by medical examiners are not sub-
ject to Rosario. See, e.g., People v. Mines, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 8, 1994, at 26, col. 1 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County) (stating in dicta that district attorney's office does not control Office
of Chief Medical Examiner ("OCME")); People v. McCullough, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 7, 1994,
at 29, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Kings County) (determining that work product of medical exam-
iner's office was not in constructive possession of district attorney); People v. Railey,
159 Misc. 2d 393, 399, 604 N.Y.S.2d 680, 683 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1993) (defining
OCME as independent agency, not law enforcement agency). For decisions applying
the Rosario rule to statements made by the OCME, see People v. Jones, N.Y. L.J.,
Feb. 8, 1994, at 23, col. 3, 24, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. Kings County) (holding that prosecutor's
access to OCME documents constitutes constructive possession); People v. Wright,
N.Y. L.J., Dec. 10, 1993, at 27, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County) (finding that OCME
worksheet, which stated immediate cause of death, was Rosario material because au-
topsy report lacked this information and, therefore, was not its "duplicative
equivalent").
6 N.Y. L.J., Feb. 8, 1994, at 23, col. 3. See Autopsy Issue, supra note 5, at 1 (com-
menting that Jones holding continues controversy facing New York courts regarding
autopsy tapes).
7 See Jones, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 8, 1994, at 24, col. 4-5. There is no requirement that
the statement be in the "sole custody" of the prosecutor. People v. Ranghelle, 69
N.Y.2d 56, 64, 503 N.E.2d 1011, 1016, 511 N.Y.S.2d, 580, 585 (1986) (holding that
police report filed at precinct, and readily accessible to prosecutor, is Rosario mate-
rial). The Jones court concluded that "the prosecution is responsible for all the docu-
ments in their actual or constructive possession or control." Jones, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 8,
1994, at 24, col. 5 (emphasis added).
8 See Jones, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 8, 1994, at 23, col. 4. During rush hour, the defendant
drove his vehicle at a rate of approximately 69 miles per hour in a 30 mile per hour
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Department, affirmed the conviction of manslaughter in the sec-
ond degree.9 The defendant made a post-judgment motion to va-
cate the conviction under CPL section 440.10,10 arguing that the
prosecutor's failure to provide him with a copy of an audiotape
made by the medical examiner during the autopsy violated the Ro-
sario rule." A prosecution witness, Associate Medical Examiner
Dr. Eddy Lilavois, had conducted the autopsy and testified con-
cerning the cause of death. 2 Although defense counsel received
zone. Id. He ignored a red light and drove onto a sidewalk crowded with pedestrians.
Id. To avoid another vehicle, Jones drove on the sidewalk a second time. Id. Tragi-
cally, the car struck and then carried the child for approximately 15 feet until it came
to a halt at a supermarket. Id.
9 See People v. Jones, 198 A.D.2d 436, 604 N.Y.S.2d 145 (2d Dep't 1993), appeal
denied, 82 N.Y.2d 926, 632 N.E.2d 488, 610 N.Y.S.2d 178 (1994). The Second Depart-
ment also affirmed the convictions of criminal possession of stolen property in the
third degree and leaving the scene of an accident. Id.; see Jones, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 8,
1994, at 23, col. 4.
10 See Jones, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 8, 1994, at 23, col. 4; see also CPL § 440.10(1) (Mc-
Kinney 1994). CPL § 440.10(1) states in part:
1. At any time after the entry of a judgment, the court in which it was
entered may, upon motion of the defendant, vacate such judgment upon the
ground that:
(f) Improper and prejudicial conduct not appearing in the record oc-
curred during a trial resulting in the judgment which conduct, if it
had appeared in the record, would have required a reversal of the
judgment upon an appeal therefrom ....
Id. CPL § 440.10 codified the common-law doctrine of coram nobis. See HENRY B.
ROTHBLATr, CmusNAL LAw OF NEW YoRm THE CRmuNAL PROCEDURE LAv § 437, at
337 (1971). Coram nobis enabled appellate courts to consider errors, regardless of
whether they had been raised by the defendant at the trial court level. John C. Cor-
bett, Coram Nobis, 29 BROOK. BARRISTER 147, 147 (1978).
11 See Jones, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 8, 1994, at 23, col. 3. In reviewing the defendant's
motion to vacate judgment, the New York Supreme Court did not address the defend-
ant's two other convictions, because the autopsy audiotape was only relevant to the
manslaughter conviction. See id. at 24, col 6.
12 Id. at 23, col. 4. In one trial, Dr. Lilavois stated that it was his practice to take
notes during the autopsy, which he would later dictate into a tape recorder. See Peo-
ple v. Huggins, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 23, 1993, at 34, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. Kings County). A typist
would then transcribe the audiotape to produce the written autopsy report, and Dr.
Lilavois would check the autopsy report for errors. Id. InHuggins, the assistant medi-
cal examiner could not recall if the audiotape had been destroyed. Id. This fact is often
relevant because different standards exist for Rosario material that has been lost or
destroyed. See People v. Martinez, 71 N.Y.2d 937, 940, 524 N.E.2d 134, 136, 528
N.Y.S.2d 813, 815 (1988). If such material has not been produced because it has been
lost or destroyed, the trial judge, in his or her discretion, will sanction the prosecution
for its lack of care in preserving the material. Id.
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Dr. Lilavois' autopsy report through the discovery process,13 the
prosecutor failed to include the audiotape.1 4
The New York Supreme Court, New York County, in a deci-
sion written by Justice Kreindler, 15 concluded that portions of the
audiotape pertained to the "subject matter" of the witness' testi-
mony1 6 and were not the "duplicative equivalent" of the autopsy
report.' 7 Further, the court dismissed the theory used by other
13 Jones, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 8, 1994, at 23, col. 4; see People v. Solomon, 160 Misc. 2d.
945, 946-47, 612 N.Y.S.2d 779, 780 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1994) (holding that au-
topsy report is discoverable scientific report, and falls under Rosario rule if medical
examiner who prepared report testifies at trial); see also CPL § 240.20(1)(c) (McKin-
ney 1993). CPL § 240.20(1)(c) provides:
[T]he prosecutor shall disclose to the defendant and make available for in-
spection, photographing, copying or testing, the following property:
(c) Any written report or document, or portion thereof, concerning a
physical or mental examination, . . . relating to the criminal action or
proceeding which was made by, or at the request or direction of a
public servant engaged in law enforcement activity, or which was
made by a person whom the prosecutor intends to call as a witness at
trial, or which the people intend to introduce at trial.
Id.
14 See Jones, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 8, 1994, at 23, col. 4.
15 See id. at 23, col. 3.
16 See id. at 24, col 2; People v. Perez, 65 N.Y.2d 154, 158-59, 480 N.E.2d 361,
364, 490 N.Y.S.2d 747, 750 (1985). Statements that do not pertain to the "subject
matter" of the testimony are not Rosario material. Id.; see also People v. Poole, 48
N.Y.2d 144, 148, 397 N.E.2d 697, 699-700, 422 N.Y.S.2d 5, 8 (1979) (concluding that
trial court should hold in camera inspection to determine whether subject matter con-
stitutes Rosario material). The Jones court compared the audiotape prepared by Dr.
Lilavois with his trial testimony, and concluded that four of the nine alleged discrep-
ancies between the autopsy report and the audiotape pertained to the subject matter
of the testimony. See Jones, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 8, 1994, at 24, col. 2. These discrepancies
included the victim's name, which was stated as "Angel Serrano" on the audiotape
and "Luis Angel Serrano" in the autopsy report. Id. In the written report, Dr. Lilavois
described the victim's body as exhibiting "needle" puncture wounds, but failed to rec-
ord this observation on the audiotape. Id. The audiotape specifically referred to cer-
tain wounds as 'two gaping lacerations," yet, in the report, the number two merely
indicated the second in a list of wounds. Id. Finally, Justice Kreindler found a discrep-
ancy between the report and the audiotape concerning the descriptions of the lacera-
tions. Id. Although the court held that these four items pertained to the subject mat-
ter of the testimony, only the last two compelled further review under Rosario
because they were not duplicative equivalents of the written autopsy report. Id. at 24,
col. 4; see also infra note 17 and accompanying text (describing duplicative equivalent
material).
17 Jones, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 8, 1994, at 24, col. 4; see, e.g., People v. Consolazio, 40
N.Y.2d 446, 454-55, 354 N.E.2d 801, 806, 387 N.Y.S.2d 62, 66 (1976) (holding that
prosecutor's worksheets not made available to defense counsel did not constitute Ro-
sario material because worksheets were duplicative equivalent of statements pro-
vided to defendant), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 914 (1977); People v. Banch, 80 N.Y.2d 610,
1016 [Vol. 68:1013
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trial courts"8 and the New York Appellate Division" which re-
gards a prosecutor's control over the agency as the standard for
possession or control.20 Although the court agreed that whether
the individual in possession of the material is engaged in law en-
forcement is a factor to be considered, the court determined that a
prosecutor's control over the material, rather than control over the
agency, governs whether it falls under the Rosario rule.2" Finally,
the court consulted the relevant sections of the Administrative
616-17, 608 N.E.2d 1069, 1073, 593 N.Y.S.2d 491, 495 (1992) (stating that material
that is duplicative equivalent of material provided to defendant is not subject to Rosa-
rio considerations). The New York Court of Appeals has interpreted the phrase "dupli-
cative equivalent" to mean that there are no discrepancies, however minor, between
the document the defendant has in his or her possession and the document the de-
fendant has not yet received. See People v. Ranghelle, 69 N.Y.2d 56, 65, 503 N.E.2d
1011, 1017, 511 N.Y.S.2d 580, 586 (1986) (holding that undiscovered police memo
books containing victim's statements and police incident reports detailing victim's
statements were not duplicative equivalents due to minor inconsistencies).
18 See, e.g., People v. France, 159 Misc. 2d 869, 871, 877, 608 N.Y.S.2d 1006,
1007-08, 1011 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1994) (focusing on fact that medical examiner
is independent from district attorney and holding that autopsy tapes are not Rosario
material); People v. Farrel, 159 Misc. 2d 992, 995, 607 N.Y.S.2d 557, 559 (Sup. Ct.
Richmond County 1994) ("The nature of the entity or individual retaining the eviden-
tiary material is determinative."); People v. Railey, 159 Misc. 2d 393, 399, 604
N.Y.S.2d 680, 683-84 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1993) (holding that OCME is independ-
ent agency not controlled by district attorney).
19 See People v. Smith, 206 A.D.2d 102, 110-11, 618 N.Y.S.2d 649, 655 (1st Dep't
1994) (holding that OCME is independent agency with no law enforcement powers
and that mere access to records does not constitute control); People v. Washington,
196 A D.2d 346, 351, 612 N.Y.S.2d 586, 588 (2d Dep't) (concluding that district attor-
ney's access to medical examiner's records "does not rise to the level of control re-
quired under the Rosario rule"), appeal granted, 83 N.Y.2d 1008, 640 N.E.2d 157, 616
N.Y.S.2d 489 (1994), affd, 86 N.Y.2d 189, 654 N.E.2d 967, 630 N.Y.S.2d 693 (1995).
In Smith, the Appellate Division, First Department, consolidated and heard four
appeals in which the defendants argued that the failure of the prosecution to produce
the medical examiner's audiotapes required reversal of their murder convictions.
Smith, 206 A.D.2d at 103-04, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 650-51. Steven Smith, a squatter in
Bellevue Hospital, sodomized, raped, and strangled a pregnant doctor employed by
the hospital. Id. at 104, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 651. The court described the strong evidence
presented against the defendant, including admissions, blood stains, and DNA evi-
dence. Id. The court also addressed the appeal of Pasqual Carpenter, who was in-
volved in the murder of Brian Watkins, a tourist from Utah. Id. at 107-08, 618
N.Y.S.2d at 653. It is suggested that the court was unwilling to contemplate a possible
Rosario violation if to do so would entail overturning such highly publicized convic-
tions. See Emily Suchar, 4 Guilty in Slay of Utah Tourist, NEwsDAY, Dec. 11, 1991, at
3.
20 See Jones, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 8, 1994, at 24, col. 5 ("Control of the material is the
standard, not control over the agency.").
21 Id.
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Code of the City of New York22 and the New York City Charter"
and concluded that the prosecutor's access to material in the
OCME was tantamount to constructive possession of the
audiotape.2 4
In holding that the Rosario rule was applicable in the case of
a medical examiner's audiotape, Justice Kreindler also faced the
22 NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE tit. 17, § 17-205 (1993). The Code provides, in
pertinent part: "The appropriate district attorney and the police commissioner of the
city may require from the chief medical examiner such further records, and such daily
information, as they may deem necessary." Id. But see People v. McCullough, N.Y.
L.J., Jan. 7, 1994, at 29, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Kings County). In McCullough, Justice Aiello
disagreed with the argument that the New York City Administrative Code in and of
itself creates a Rosario obligation regarding medical examiners' records. Id.; see Tug
of War, supra note 5, at 1.
23 NEW YORK CrrY CHARTER § 557(g) (1993) states in part: "The chief medical ex-
aminer shall keep full and complete records in such form as may be provided by law.
He shall promptly deliver to the appropriate district attorney copies of all records
relating to every death as to which there is ... any indication of criminality." Id.
(emphasis added).
One judge has suggested that if the medical examiner follows the procedure re-
quired by the Charter, the prosecutor should be the one in possession of the audi-
otapes. See Smith, 206 A-D.2d at 114, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 657 (Murphy, P.J., dissenting).
The fact that the prosecutor did not receive all of the records should not excuse a
possible Rosario violation. See id. at 116-17, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 658.
24 See Jones, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 8, 1994, at 24, col. 5. Justice Kreindler stated:
The court concludes that while the Medical Examiner's office is an independ-
ent investigatory department of the New York City Department of the New
York City Department of Health, the prosecution has access to and some
control over the Medical Examiner's records. Although the control over the
records is not total, it is sufficient for the purposes of the Rosario rule.
Id. (citations omitted).
It is argued that the proper focus is upon access to the material. See People v.
Fishman, 72 N.Y.2d 884, 886, 528 N.E.2d 1212, 1213, 532 N.Y.S.2d 739, 740 (1988)
("Having had no immediate access of their own to the statements, the People cannot
be held responsible for a failure to turn them over to defendant.") (citation omitted);
see also People v. Solomon, 160 Misc. 2d 945, 947, 612 N.Y.S.2d 779, 781 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1994) (reasoning that "the prosecutor has sufficient access to and con-
trol over the Medical Examiner's records to render such records potential Rosario ma-
terial") (citation omitted). The New York Court of Appeals has indicated that when
the existence of a document is "readily ascertainable by the prosecutor, there is no
reason to dilute the Rosario obligation by holding that defense counsel should have
himself subpoenaed the document." People v. Ranghelle, 69 N.Y.2d 56, 64, 503 N.E.2d
1011, 1016, 511 N.Y.S.2d 580, 585 (1986). In Jones, the court considered the following
factors in concluding that the prosecutor had possession or control over the audi-
otapes: (1) the OCME is an independent unit of the Department of Health; (2) the
OCME is generally an investigatory agency rather than strictly an administrative
agency; (3) the medical examiner can act as a quasi-judicial officer, with power to
subpoena witnesses and conduct hearings; (4) the prosecution has access to and some
control over OCME records under the New York City Charter and the Administrative
Code of the City of New York; and (5) the medical examiner's testimony is essential to
homicide trials. See Jones, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 8, 1994, at 24, col. 5.
1018 [Vol. 68:1013
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critical issue of whether this decision should operate retroac-
tively.2 5 Because the defendant had not exhausted his direct ap-
peal, a retroactive application would result in per se reversible er-
ror.2 6 Justice Kreindler, considering both the repercussions that
would follow such a holding and the policy reasons behind the Ro-
sario rule, determined that his decision created a "new rule."27
Since a new rule may be applied prospectively, as opposed to ret-
roactively,28 the court denied the defendant's motion to vacate his
conviction.29
It is submitted that the Jones court, in considering the under-
lying objectives of the Rosario doctrine, reached the correct inter-
pretation of a prosecutor's "possession and control" of witnesses'
prior statements. Rosario and its progeny promote fairness to
the defendant while creating guidelines that avoid unduly bur-
dening the prosecutor . 0 Generally, the boundaries of the Rosario
25 See Jones, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 8, 1994, at 24, col. 6. Retroactivity is based on the
principle that all cases before a court should be decided on the law as it currently
stands. See People v. Pepper, 53 N.Y.2d 213, 219-20, 423 N.E.2d 366, 368, 440
N.Y.S.2d 889,891, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 967 (1981). Retroactivity also represents "the
credo that our government is one of laws and not of men, a concept which depends
heavily on a sense of continuity." Id. at 220,423 N.E.2d at 368,440 N.Y.S.2d at 891. If
no constitutional issues are involved, courts need only consult state law to determine
whether a rule will be applied retroactively. See People v. Mitchell, 80 N.Y.2d 519,
527, 606 N.E.2d 1381, 1385, 591 N.Y.S.2d 990, 994 (1992) (applying New York princi-
ples of retroactivity). Rosario was based on "policy considerations" and fairness,
rather than on constitutional principles, and, therefore, would not require constitu-
tional analysis. See Jones, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 8, 1994, at 24, col. 6.
26 See Ranghelle, 69 N.Y.2d at 63, 503 N.E.2d at 1016, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 585. The
Ranghelle court held that the prosecutions failure to deliver Rosario material to de-
fense counsel constituted per se reversible error, whereas a delay in the delivery
would be reversible error only if "the defense was materially prejudiced by the delay."
Id. A defendant who has exhausted the appeal process must prove improper conduct
and must establish that the prosecutor's failure to provide Rosario material resulted
in prejudice. See People v. Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d 638, 649, 585 N.E.2d 795, 802, 578
N.Y.S.2d 483, 490 (1991) (requiring defendant to demonstrate reasonable possibility
that failure to disclose Rosario material contributed to guilty verdict); see also supra
note 10 (discussing CPL § 440.10(1)).
27 Jones, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 8, 1994, at 24, col. 6; see infra notes 50-51 and accompa-
nying text.
28 See Pepper, 53 N.Y.2d at 220, 423 N.E.2d at 369, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 891.
29 Jones, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 8, 1994, at 24, col. 6.
30 People v. Grissom, 128 Misc. 2d 246, 248, 490 N.Y.S.2d 110, 112-13 (N.Y.C.
Crim. Ct. N.Y. County 1985). One judge has suggested that the argument presented
by prosecutors against deeming medical examiners' audiotapes Rosario material be-
cause the OCME is not a law enforcement agency is an argument "of convenience."
People v. Smith, 206 A.D.2d 102, 119, 618 N.Y.S.2d 649, 659-60 (1st Dep't 1994)
(Murphy, P.J., dissenting).
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rule3 ' exclude from its application documents that require confi-
dentiality3 2 and materials to which a prosecutor has no greater
access than does defense counsel.3 3 Although documents created
by the OCME are not subject to public review,3 they are accessi-
ble to both the prosecutor and defense counsel. Defendants, how-
ever, may be required to subpoena records from the OCME, 5
whereas records pertaining to deaths in which criminality is sus-
pected must be delivered to the prosecution,36 and prosecutors
need only make a request for "such further records . . . as they
may deem necessary."3 7 As a result, prosecutors are in a far bet-
ter position to obtain relevant documents that are essential to de-
31 See People v. Ranghelle, 69 N.Y.2d 56, 63, 503 N.E.2d 1011, 1015, 511 N.Y.S.2d
580, 586 (1986).
32 See People v. Tissois, 72 N.Y.2d 75, 78, 526 N.E.2d 1086, 1087, 531 N.Y.S.2d
228, 229 (1988) (holding that statements made to social worker were confidential and
therefore not in possession or control of prosecutor); Ranghelle, 69 N.Y.2d at 63, 503
N.E.2d at 1015, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 584 (stating that breadth ofRosario doctrine does not
include confidential documents or duplicative equivalents).
33 See People v. Fishman, 72 N.Y.2d 884, 886, 528 N.E.2d 1212, 1213, 532
N.Y.S.2d 739, 740 (1988). In Fishman, the prosecutor had ordered, but not received,
untranscribed plea allocution minutes from a court stenographer at the time defense
counsel requested the minutes. Id. at 885, 528 N.E.2d at 1212, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 739.
The court held that the prosecutors had "no immediate access of their own to the
statements." Id. at 886, 528 N.E.2d at 1213, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 740; see also People v.
Bailey, 73 N.Y.2d 812, 813, 534 N.E.2d 28, 28-29, 537 N.Y.S.2d 111, 112 (1988). In
Bailey, the court held that a statement concerning the crime charged made by a prose-
cution witness was not Rosario material because the statement had been made to the
witness' employer, rather than to the prosecutor, and the prosecutor did not have any
knowledge, possession, or control of the employer's records. Id.
34 NEW YORK CiTY CHARTER § 557(g) (1993) (providing that "[sluch records shall
not be open to public inspection").
35 See People v. France, 159 Misc. 2d 869, 878, 608 N.Y.S.2d 1006, 1012 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1994). But see People v. Ramsay, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 19, 1994, at 25, col. 3
(Sup. Ct. Kings County) (noting statement by defense attorney in Jones that medical
examiner's audiotape was provided after request by letter). The defendant's access to
material within the prosecution's possession or control, however, does not relieve
prosecutors of the Rosario obligation. See Ranghelle, 69 N.Y.2d at 64, 503 N.E.2d at
1016, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 585.
36 NEW YORK Crry CHARTER § 557(g) (1993); see supra note 23 (discussing
§ 557(g)).
37 NEW YORK, N.Y., AD nN. CODE tit. 17, § 17-205 (1993). Justice Kreindler
viewed this provision as giving the prosecution some control over the agency. See Peo-
ple v. Jones, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 8, 1994, at 23, col. 3, 24, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. Kings County).
But see People v. McCullough, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 7, 1994, at 29, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County) (mere fact that OCME must allow district attorney access to its files does not
render such files in possession of prosecution).
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fense counsel's ability to cross-examine prosecution witnesses
effectively.3
While many courts confronted with a Rosario issue have fo-
cused on whether the possessor of the material was a law enforce-
ment agency to determine whether the prosecutor had possession
or control of prior statements, 9 the Jones court properly noted
that this is only one factor to be considered.40 The Rosario rule is
not limited to statements made or solicited by law enforcement
agencies or agencies controlled by the prosecutor.41 Rosario, with-
out qualification, permitted the defendant to review a witness'
prior statements.42 The New York Legislature, by enacting CPL
38 See People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286, 290, 173 N.E.2d 881, 883, 213 N.Y.S.2d
448, 451, cert. denied, 386 U.S. 886 (1961). The Rosario court feared that "there is
always a danger that something will be withheld from defense counsel which may
assist him in impeaching the prosecution's witness." Id.
The importance of the opportunity to cross-examine the medical examiner should
not be underestimated. See People v. Smith, 206 A.D.2d 102, 114-15, 618 N.Y.S.2d
649, 657 (1st Dep't 1994) (Murphy, P.J., dissenting). "[E]ffective cross-examination of
the pathologist will in many cases be vital to the defendant's prospects for acquittal."
Id. A jury might question the credibility of the witness if there are discrepancies in
the audiotapes and the autopsy report.
39 See, e.g., People v. Mines, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 8, 1994, at 26, col. 1, col. 2 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County); People v. Railey, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 6, 1993, at 29, col. 4, col. 6 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County) (refusing to extend Rosario to case in which prosecutor did not have
constructive possession of material). In Jones, Justice Kreindler reasoned that,
although the district attorney's office does not control the police department, docu-
ments produced by the police department are subject to the Rosario rule. See Jones,
N.Y. L.J., Feb. 8, 1994, at 24, col. 5.
40 See Jones, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 8, 1994, at 24, col. 5.
41 See CPL § 240.45 (McKinney 1993); supra note 3 (providing language of CPL
§ 240.45(1)(a)); Jones, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 8, 1994, at 24, col. 4 (observing that "material in
the actual possession of the prosecution but not generated by institutionally con-
trolled' agencies" is subject to Rosario); see also People v. Ranghelle, 69 N.Y.2d 56, 64,
503 N.E.2d 1011, 1016, 511 N.Y.S.2d 580, 585 (1986) (rejecting prosecutor's argument
that Rosario should be limited to situations in which prosecution has sole custody of
material); People v. Payne, 52 N.Y.2d 743, 745, 417 N.E.2d 564, 565, 436 N.Y.S.2d
271, 272 (1980) (amrming conviction for murder in first degree over defense objection
to prosecutor's failure to turn over police notes of witness' prior statements); People v.
Gilligan, 39 N.Y.2d 769, 770, 349 N.E.2d 879, 879, 384 N.Y.S.2d 778, 778 (1976) (find-
ing error in denial of defense request to inspect police officers' notes and reports);
People v. Malinsky, 15 N.Y.2d 86, 90-91, 209 N.E.2d 694, 697, 262 N.Y.S.2d 65, 70
(1965) (requiring that detective's notes be turned over to defense counsel); cf People
v. Fields, 146 A.D.2d 505, 510, 537 N.Y.S.2d 157, 161 (1st Dep't) (finding that parole
officer's notes constituted Rosario material, despite fact that they were not in posses-
sion of prosecution, because they were in possession and control of law enforcement
agency), appeal decided, 156 A.D.2d 225, 548 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1st Dep't 1989), appeal
denied, 75 N.Y.2d 918, 554 N.E.2d 74, 555 N.Y.S.2d 37 (1990).
42 Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d at 289, 173 N.E.2d at 883, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 450. An overly
broad reading of Rosario, however, which would entitle a defendant to any statement
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section 240.45, intended to further broaden the scope of the Rosa-
rio holding.43 While the OCME may not by definition constitute a
law enforcement agency or an agency controlled by the prosecutor,
the district attorney's access to OCME records created sufficient
control to warrant a Rosario obligation. 4 The OCME must pro-
vide the prosecutor with all records of crime-related death,45 and,
conversely, the district attorney may request any documents
deemed necessary to the prosecution of a defendant.46 Addition-
ally, the two agencies share a common goal-to establish the
cause of death-which is an essential element prosecutors must
prove in a homicide trial.4 7
It is further suggested that courts have resisted enforcing the
Rosario rule in this area because they fear that retroactive appli-
cation of the rule will disrupt presumptively valid48 homicide con-
victions. 49 The New York Court of Appeals, however, recognizing
that "might [be] of use to the defense" is not advocated. See People v. Fishman, 72
N.Y.2d 884, 888, 528 N.E.2d 1212, 1214, 532 N.Y.S.2d 739, 741 (1988) (Titone, J.,
dissenting).
43 See Fishman, 72 N.Y.2d at 887, 528 N.E.2d at 1213, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 740-41
(Titone, J., dissenting). The legislature sought to take "a reasonable and balanced
step forward in broadening pre-trial discovery." Id. at 887 n.*, 528 N.E.2d at 1214 n.*,
532 N.Y.S.2d at 741 n.* (quoting letter submitted by District Attorneys' Association).
44 See Jones, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 8, 1994, at 24, col. 5; see also supra note 24 and
accompanying text (discussing factors court considered in determining whether prose-
cution had possession or control of audiotapes).
45 See NEW YORK CiTY CHARTER § 557(g) (1993); see also supra note 23.
45 See NEw YORK, N.Y., ADmiN. CODE tit. 17, § 17-205 (1993); see also supra note
22.
47 See Jones, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 8, 1994, at 24, col. 5; NEW YORK, N.Y., ADmw. CODE
tit. 17, § 17-203 ("If the medical examiner... has reason to suspect that a homicide
has been committed, [an] autopsy shall be performed . . ."); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§§ 125.00-.60 (McKinney 1987). "Homicide means conduct which causes the death of a
person.. . ." Id. § 125.00.
48 People v. Session, 34 N.Y.2d 254, 255-56, 313 N.E.2d 728, 729, 357 N.Y.S.2d
409, 410 (1974) (stating that convictions are presumed to be valid).
49 See Autopsy Issue, supra note 5, at 1 (stating that approximately 200 defend-
ants have made motions to vacate convictions based on prosecution's failure to pro-
vide defense with autopsy tapes).
Addressing a similar dilemma, the New York Court of Appeals recently held that
the rule requiring a defendant to be present at a side bar during voir dire is not retro-
active. See People v. Mitchell, 80 N.Y.2d 519, 529, 606 N.E.2d 1381, 1386, 591
N.Y.S.2d 990, 995 (1992); see also Sidney H. Stein, Retroactivity of'Sandovar Rights,
N.Y. L.J., Nov. 30, 1993, at 3. The court also decided in a later case, however, that a
defendant's right to be present during a Sandoval hearing is retroactive. See People v.
Favor, 82 N.Y.2d 254, 266-67, 624 N.E.2d 631, 639, 604 N.Y.S.2d 494, 502 (1993);
Stein, supra, at 3.
It is possible that a court would find the rule characterizing autopsy audiotapes
as Rosario material to be "another point in a continuum of cases explaining and ap-
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the potential harm that absolute retroactivity may create, pro-
vided an exception permitting prospective application of a "new
rule."50 A new rule, such as that created by the Jones court, is
established when a court's holding "represent[s] a dramatic shift
away from customary and established procedure."51 Prior to the
recent attention focused on the existence of the medical exam-
iner's audiotapes, prosecutors were not obligated to supply them
to defendants, nor did defense attorneys specifically request them.
Accordingly, any retroactive application of the law requiring pros-
ecutors to deliver material produced by the OCME would unfairly
penalize the prosecutor for having followed accepted practices. 52
Further, in determining whether retroactivity is applicable, a
court examines the purpose of the new rule, reliance upon the old
rule, and the effect that the new rule would have on the "adminis-
tration of justice."53 Although the policies promoting disclosure of
plying [a] statutory right... ", and, therefore, deny prospectivity. See Favor, 82
N.Y.2d at 265, 624 N.E.2d at 637, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 500. In Favor, the court rejected
the argument that retroactivity of the Sandoval rule would result in widespread re-
versals. Id. at 266, 624 N.E.2d at 638, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 501. Indeed, the results were
not as disastrous as predicted. See Gary Spencer, Review Ordered on Defendant's
Hearing, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 12, 1994, at 1.
In Mitchell, the court determined that reconstructive hearings would be neces-
sary and would therefore impose a burden upon the administration of the court sys-
tem. See Mitchell, 80 N.Y.2d at 528, 606 N.E.2d at 1386, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 992. The
court in Favor, however, found that a reconstructive hearing would not be required
and, therefore, retroactivity was appropriate. See Favor, 82 N.Y.2d at 266, 624 N.E.2d
at 638, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 501. Although reconstructive hearings would not be necessary
in cases such as Jones, courts would be required to review each and every prior state-
ment to determine if it pertained to the "subject matter" of the testimony or was the
duplicative equivalent of the material already submitted to defendant. See supra
notes 16-17 (discussing terms "subject matter" and "duplicative equivalent").
50 See Favor, 82 N.Y.2d at 266, 624 N.E.2d at 638, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 501 (noting
that "special factors... that would have a serious deleterious effect on the adminis-
tration of justice" might warrant prospectivity); Stein, supra note 49, at 3 (observing
that retroactive approach reflects legal realist view that judges do more than "dis-
cover" law).
51 Favor, 82 N.Y.2d at 263, 624 N.E.2d at 636, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 499.
52 Traditionally, when the prosecutor did not know of the existence of the mate-
rial, there was no Rosario violation. See, e.g., People v. Bailey, 73 N.Y.2d 812, 813, 534
N.E.2d 28, 28-29, 537 N.Y.S.2d 111, 112 (1988); see also supra text accompanying
notes 31-33 (stating that Rosario rule excluded materials that prosecutor had no
greater access to than defendant).
53 See People v. Pepper, 53 N.Y.2d 213, 220, 423 N.E.2d 366, 369, 440 N.Y.S.2d
889, 892 (1981). The United States Supreme Court developed these three factors. Id.;
see also Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 249 (1969). Other factors to be consid-
ered in determining if a decision constitutes a new rule are: (1) whether the holding
overrules precedent, and (2) whether the holding causes a "sharp break in the con-
tinuity of law." Favor, 82 N.Y.2d at 263, 624 N.E.2d at 636, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 499.
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documents to defendants could support retroactive application of
the Jones holding, it is submitted that the reliance of prosecutors
and courts on the absence of a Rosario obligation in such situa-
tions required that the rule in Jones be applied prospectively.54
Additionally, the considerable number of CPL section 440.10 mo-
tions that have been filed to date seeking to vacate convictions on
the ground that autopsy audiotapes were not given to the defense
foreshadow an overwhelming burden on the court system if the
holding were to be applied retroactively. 55 Thus, the "new rule"
doctrine provides a plausible remedy to the risk of widespread
reversals.
By characterizing the audiotape as discoverable material and
subsequently identifying the decision as a "new rule," the court
reached a compromise that furthered the policy goals of Rosario
without penalizing prosecutors. A defendant should be entitled to
material that is readily available to the prosecutor and may aid in
his or her defense without the added consequence of "wreak[ing]
... havoc in society" by retroactively upsetting well established
principles of law.
5 6
Courtney M. Spellman
54 See People v. Mitchell, 80 N.Y.2d 519, 528-29, 606 N.E.2d 1381, 1386, 591
N.Y.S.2d 990, 995 (1992) (concluding that these were "substantial reasons" to apply
new rule regarding jury selection prospectively).
55 See Tug of War, supra note 5, at 1 (approximately 150 motions filed in New
York City, 85 in Brooklyn alone); Autopsy Issue, supra note 5, at 1 (approximately 200
defendants moved to vacate convictions). The New York Law Journal reported that
defendants convicted of notorious crimes have made § 440.10 motions based on the
prosecution's failure to provide the defense with medical examiners' audiotapes, in-
cluding the defendant in the Happy Land Social Club case and the defendant con-
victed of murdering Brian Watkins. See Tug of War, supra note 5, at 1; supra note 49
(discussing numerous motions made pursuant to CPL § 440.10).
56 Favor, 82 N.Y.2d at 263, 624 N.E.2d at 636, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 499.
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